What You Can Do

Credit: Alison Doig/Recourse

Civil Society Advocacy on the IMF

Holding the IMF accountable for its far-reaching development and climate impacts is crucial – both where its decisions and strategies are made globally and in countries where it intervenes in domestic policy. Civil society resistance to the Fund has a decade-long history both in the Global North and South. As a result, the IMF has worked to improve its openness to civil society – at the global and national levels – including by establishing a dedicated Civil Society Team within its communications department and developing staff guidance in 2015 to encourage better exchange with CSOs. Most IMF staff tend to be open to hear out well-defined demands on specific issues that fall within the IMF’s remit. Nevertheless, it can require quite high levels of technical expertise, and a meeting or consultation often does not result in immediate policy change. Here are some practical insights on engagement opportunities, common challenges, and things to keep in mind.

Civil society engaging with the IMF includes a diverse range of organisations, such as think tanks (both in Washington, DC and in other countries), IFI watchdogs, national economic justice organisations, regional networks, academic associations, and community grassroots groups. These diverse CSOs pursue different approaches and tactics in their engagement, and balancing insider and outsider avenues as well as the pursuit of incremental change vs transformative approaches can be challenging. Integrating both in a consistent manner is important to ensure that insider engagement remains rooted in structural, feminist, and movement centred change demands.

Insider advocacy: Insider tactics can include: 

  • Influencing policy processes within the IMF (e.g. the development and review of strategies, see next section).
  • Questioning the evidence base of IMF policies and submitting one’s own evidence
  • Drafting technical proposals for how the Fund could do things better and entering policy dialogues and consultations with IMF teams.
  • Advocating for reforms to the IMF governance structure, e.g. in the context of periodic quota reviews.
  • Identifying ‘insider champions’ to build consistent relationships and share information with.
  • ‘Influencing the influencers’, such as the decision-makers and legislatives of powerful governments that hold sway within the Fund.

Outsider advocacy: Outsider tactics can include:

  • Challenging the legitimacy and outsized power of the IMF and aiming to minimise its role, shifting decision-making power to more equitable institutions like the UN.
  • Demanding accountability and reparations for harmful impacts of IMF-led policies.
  • Calling these impacts out publicly and raising media attention.
  • Engaging in visible actions of resistance, such as manifestations, marches, protests.

Crucial advocacy moments and sources of information for advocacy at a global level are:

  • Strategic reviews & developments (e.g. periodic reviews of IMF instruments and strategies, such as the Comprehensive Surveillance Review or the Climate Strategy) as well as the development of new instruments (e.g. the RST). Some of these processes include open public consultations or more targeted consultations of select groups, e.g. conference calls and calls for written comments. These engagements are usually managed by the civil society team on the IMF side; and coordinated on the CSO side by a group of established networks. Where leadership of such efforts may change, these organisations remain good points of first contact to find the correct partner or ally.

Some key organisations engaging the IMF

Global: Bretton Woods Project, Recourse, Oxfam’s IFI team

Regional: Eurodad (Europe), Afrodad (Africa), and Latindadd (Latin America), MENAFem Movement (MENA region)

Credit: WB IMF Annual Meetings 2024_stunt Omar Elmawi 2_credit Madeleine Race-Recourse
  • Evaluations of the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). The IEO, the Fund’s internal evaluator, publishes regular updates on their work programme and is usually keen to hear civil society perspectives. While evaluators are IMF staff and their recommendations are hardly radical, they have an associated review and reporting process involving the Board. Thus, follow up is required and can be a tool for accountability.
  • Spring and Annual Meetings and the associated Civil Society Policy Forum (CSPF) events. Springs and Annuals are an opportunity to use the fact that everyone is in town to set up 1-1 advocacy meetings with EDs and IMF staff and mission chiefs (but be aware that schedules are packed) and participate in roundtables, e.g. with European EDs which are coordinated by the same CSOs mentioned above (in general, the Bretton Woods Project can help you find the right contact, as they are a dedicated civil society platform focused on the IMF and World Bank). The accompanying CSPF is an opportunity to invite relevant IMF staff and have a critical discussion on their work. Springs and Annuals can also be a useful moment for media advocacy within a focused campaign (e.g. media stunts, ‘outsider’ actions with high visibility, launching of new reports through side events) as there is some attention already, but this requires groundwork in advance. The fact that many IMF influencer CSOs come to Springs and Annuals in person also makes this a good opportunity to set up internal strategy meetings with coalitions and partners. Lastly, different country groupings issue communiques at the end of the conference, including the IMFC, G20, etc. – monitoring these is an opportunity to understand country positions.
  • Other documents that indicate the Fund’s direction and strategic priorities. Stay abreast of the MD’s twice-annual Global Policy Agenda, as well as the Board Work Program (also twice-annual, setting out a plan for the next 12 months), which outline priority issues and a basic timeline for when they will be discussed. Policy papers (esp. on specific issues) and research by Fund staff (e.g. working papers & Discussion Notes) can help to identify interesting avenues of work internally and to highlight contradictions between research and action.
  • IMF quota reviews. While these processes are usually marred in geopolitics, they are an opportunity to advance more equitable governance proposals and continue putting the spotlight on the IMF’s colonial structure. Influencing of Global North countries (especially Europeans) that hold outsized power at the Board is crucial here – they are the ones who vote on changes and would eventually have to give up some of their shares.
  • Wider debates about financial architecture reform, e.g. on debt, climate, taxation, as well as on the rise of inequality and its impacts on the social contract and political stability (including the international economic order). Staying abreast of these discussions and developments can provide some openings for engagement – social instability is a concern to the IMF.
  • Public Information Notices (PINs) or press releases summarising key Board discussions. These are generally released shortly after meetings and are a key resource to find out what’s been decided. (Some) board meeting minutes are published with a 3-year time lag, so not useful in the moment but to reconstruct discussions later.

Crucial advocacy moments and sources of information for advocacy at a country level are:

  • Country programme (loan) negotiations. The final sign-off on loan programmes rests with the IMF Executive Board, but before that IMF staff spend months and sometimes years on missions to firm up loan packages and conditions with the borrower governments – this is the time to for influencing. Conditionalities are formulated in a ‘Letter of Intent’ (LOI) and a ‘Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies’ (MEFP), summarised for sign-off in a ‘Technical Memorandum of Understanding’ (TMU) – these documents are crucial to understand planned changes in fiscal policy or any legislative measures (such as the privatization of key public assets, or limits on debt financing) and often indicate a timeline for each policy measure. The IMF undertakes regular reviews of how a country is meeting its loan conditionalities and any programme changes – these reviews are also published.
  • Read (& translate) available documents. Make sure to be aware of IMF loan documents (letter of intent, policy memorandum), Article IV reports, World Bank country reports, regional economic outlooks, press briefings… a lot of country-specific data is gathered on individual IMF country pages, as well as other databases by topic. This should also include contact details for the IMF ‘Resident Representative’ in the country. Often, documents are only in English – synthesising and translating them into local/simplified language can be an important aspect of making them more widely accessible. For climate, given the close collaboration with the World Bank, it is also worth studying the Bank’s Country Climate Development Reports (CCDRs) and what kind of policies they promote, as well as reading up on civil society criticism of the Bank’s climate policy.
  • Article IV reports are especially informative, regularly including debt sustainability analyses and views on different areas of government spending. Look for where the positions of your government and the Fund differ (e.g. on levels of social spending) and how they align with your own organization’s priorities.
  • Support national-level outreach efforts. Demand more consistent engagement and transparency from local IMF representatives, try to facilitate the participation of a wider range of interlocutors (e.g. bring in women’s rights orgs, grassroots movements etc.).
  • Media. Try to amplify the visibility of campaigns, letters and reports; provide workshops and toolkits to local journalists to influence the narrative around the role of the IMF.
  • Liaise with human rights commissions and bodies. Get in touch with UN special rapporteurs and independent experts (e.g. on human rights and climate change, right to development, and foreign debt, see list here) as well as human rights commissions to submit evidence and raise concerns on the human rights impacts of the IMF’s influence in your country.
  • Mobilise regional efforts. Join regional networks like Afrodad, Latindadd and FEMNET, participate e.g. in the Pan African Conference on Debt and Development.
  • In contexts of restricted civic space, engaging the IMF can actually be a way to demand greater accountability from your government. Fund staff do defer to authorities on the extent of consultations, but in principle most care about participation and might be able to exert some pressure. However, it is important to make them aware of civic space constraints and especially threats to secure participation, and to be specific about what conditions need to be in place to participate safely in consultations.

Here are some practical tips on the ‘how to’ of advocacy with the IMF.

Build & maintain relations: 

  • With the IMF civil society liaisons / external relations teams. They can coordinate relations with other parts of the Fund, e.g. transmitting advocacy letters to the most appropriate department, and securing a response, or providing contact details for specific staff.
  • With insider champions and ‘topic leads’, e.g. the gender and climate teams, or researchers who have written papers on a topic of interest. They can be important sources of information and are likely interested in receiving civil society research on their respective topics as well.
  • With country directors and resident representatives. Many countries have country offices, in addition to 6 regional offices. Resident Representatives (Res Reps) have the specific mandate to engage actively with in-country stakeholders, so get in touch with them to feed into surveillance missions, and find out about pending loan agreements, technical assistance to your country, and public consultations.
  • With ‘your’ EDs & their offices. Contact partner CSOs to see if corresponding meetings are taking place in your country and try to participate. If regular meetings are not taking place, take the initiative to reach out to your national/regional ED’s office directly, or through your national finance ministry, to set up meetings with CSOs, trade unions, and other groups.
  • With your own government officials. Contact your Ministry of Finance and Central Bank and identify key officials that are working on IMF issues. Also reach out to members of parliament that hold these ministers to account, e.g. members of parliamentary committees on finance and international affairs. Establish contacts and set up regular meetings.
  • With mission chiefs (based in DC). They lead negotiations with a member country when the IMF is hammering out a loan agreement or preparing an Article IV report and will steer the priorities of an IMF visit to a country (‘mission’). Usually, there are 2-3 country visits per year. There is less transparency about the names/contacts of mission teams, but check previous Art IV reports for your country and/or ask the IMF civil society team to connect you.

Monitor what’s going on and use meetings strategically:

  • Globally: Be up to date on periodic reports, reviews, conferences, the Global Policy Agenda etc. Check the IMF Civil society website for public consultations, key IMF outputs / new policies and research, and to register for participation in Springs & Annuals, as well as watch recordings from the CSPF. The Bretton Woods Project publishes a quarterly magazine (the Observer) and take-aways from each Springs & Annuals with key developments and analyses.
  • Locally: Be aware of IMF country reports & activities, e.g. loan missions, Article IV reports, etc.
  • In advance of meetings with IMF staff, EDs, or other officials, provide them with discussion papers / summary briefings laying out your positions and specific questions. Being aware of the latest work programmes and activities will enable you to propose agenda topics that are strategically linked e.g. with what the Board, or IMF country staff, will actually be discussing, or with media attention on a specific issue.

Create accountability:

  • If your organisation produces publications, evidence and research related to IMF activities, send these to relevant government officials and your national/regional ED, to ensure they are aware that you are monitoring the issues on which they work.
  • Remain vigilant on whether the IMF ‘walks the talk’ – is what is done the same as what is said? The IMF has appropriated a lot of civil society language (e.g. on gender), make sure to know what’s behind the words and call out where substance is lacking. Also call out contradictions – for example, if the IMF’s research raises issues with the policies it pursues in practice at programme level, or if commitments are made at headquarters level but seem absent in your country.

Be aware of common issues:

  • At the IMF, civil society engagement is mostly up to staff discretion and national authorities – there is no formal policy or mechanism. The 2015 guidelines are not mandatory, and expectations, motivations and conditions for engagement can vary greatly (see Expectations vs. Reality below).
  • For effective advocacy, it is important to establish direct contact with those who make decisions, e.g. country directors, EDs, and mission chiefs.
  • Still, ‘consultations’ are often one-off calls or meetings, with little proactive dissemination of information, updates and documents, and often off the record. Meaningful engagement needs consistency – always follow up, insist on commitments, feedback, and information. Make clear when you consider the process lacking and make suggestions for improvement.
  • The IMF engagement in ‘new’ topics like climate and gender has led to some more openness to solicit outside expertise, especially from national organisations when country analyses are taking place (e.g. on gender). 

Where can you find contacts and information on the IMF’s website or in the documents? In general, the Fund makes less contacts available than the World Bank, e.g. there is no public email list for the executive directors’ offices. In general, IMF emails are formed as: first initial last name @ imf.org, which should allow you to develop email contacts based on names.

Here is where you find what on the IMF’s main pages:

Read more

History:

The Alter-Globalization Movement

In reaction to the neoliberalisation of globalisation in the 1970s, the proliferation of the Washington Consensus and Structural Adjustment Programmes through the BWIs, and the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent “shock therapy” of formerly soviet states, a cross-national alter-globalization movement formed in the 1980s and 1990s that developed a different vision of global solidarity which exposed the power relations and exploitative, destructive dynamics inherent to neoliberal capitalism and confronted the supposed lack of alternatives to this model (best embodied by Fukuyama’s widely-used idea of the 'end of history'). This popular movement also stood on the shoulders of the political and ideological advances of Global South countries (many only recently decolonised), their development of a declaration and action programme for a New International Economic Order adopted by the UN GA in 1974, and the formation of UNCTAD and the G77 in 1964.

Demonstrations against summits of international organisations that were seen to embody this neoliberal order, such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and G7/G8, drew tens of thousands of protesters in the 80s and 90s. In 1994, the “50 years is enough” campaign formed, building on a host of country experiences to make the case against the IMF and World Bank. It called for “fundamental, structural changes” to the BWIs and a limiting of their power, debt relief, ending structural adjustment in favour of participatory, equitable, and sustainable economic and development policy, and the cessation to environmentally destructive lending and projects – demands that continue to resonate another 30 years later.

Credit: Demonstration organised by the Kenyan Jubilee 2000 campaign.
Source: advocacy.international.co.uk.

Around the same time, the Jubilee 2000 campaign put a global spotlight on the need for debt relief, mobilising millions of people worldwide – including a petition with over 20 million signatures – and providing impetus for the BWIs to initiate the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative in 1996 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2005.

The 1999 WTO conference resulted in the ‘battle of Seattle’ due to the large number of mass actions and protests, and the 2001 G8 summit attracted 200,000 protesters, with increasingly violent police crackdown. This state repression was exacerbated further through the ‘war on terror’ following 9/11.

Over the decades, the alter-globalization movement has changed both in terms of structure, mass appeal, and issues: Organisational infrastructure developed through formal civil society organisations, climate and ecological concerns grew in importance, and the 2008 Financial Crisis led to a resurgence of inequality on the political agenda. Feminist, climate, and anti-racists movements of recent years have integrated analyses of the way that capitalism reinforces structural and patriarchal oppression and accelerates environmental destruction.

However, despite the alter-globalization movement’s success in mobilising people and placing many critical issues into the public debate, its impact in actually affecting institutional change has been limited, which has led to its decline in mass appeal, media support, and political momentum. Climate justice and the attached organising – the most visible protest movement currently at least in the Global North – offer an opportunity to re-insert some of the critical critique of neoliberal capitalism and the institutions upholding it, and to develop a post-capitalist vision that is ecologically and economically sustainable.

Expectations vs Reality

What do the 2015 IMF Civil society engagement guidelines say?

  • Acknowledge raised expectations for more active, inclusive and timely civic participation, and the importance of listening.
  • Emphasise the value of systematic, transparent and long-term (not one-off) engagements and the value they bring for improving the Fund’s policy advice, constructive public debate, local support for reforms, and IMF accountability and legitimacy.
  • Encourage engaging diverse CSOs beyond global INGOs proactively, building trust through replying promptly and sharing materials ahead of time, avoiding one-way presentations, discussing genuine policy trade-offs, and following up post-missions.
  • Give a key role to Res Reps and local/regional staff in maintaining these relationships.
  • Suggest beginning engagement in earlier phases of policy formulations for programmes and Article IVs so CSOs are not presented with a fait accompli.

However, they are not mandatory (and often formulated in vague terms), so CSO engagement in actuality remains at the discretion of individual staff members or hinges on the efforts of the civil society liaison. The Fund’s civil society engagement also remains at the discretion of national authorities, who might intervene to prevent comprehensive consultation.

What happens in real life?

  • Engagement with CSOs is marred by an imbalance of power skewed towards the Fund and a mismatch of expectations and motivations that can leave both parties feeling unsatisfied and disenchanted (something the guidelines acknowledge). CSOs hope to actually help shape IMF programmes and policies, and to improve government transparency and accountability in the process. The IMF on the other hand seems to be engaging with CSOs primarily as a way to diversify its social and economic understanding of the country, and to gauge public perceptions of and potential adverse reactions to a prospective IMF-supported programme.
  • The setting in which national-level engagement typically takes place is characterised by informality and confidentiality. These ‘off-the-record’ interactions obscure who the IMF has or hasn’t spoken to and if and how it takes CSO feedback into account. Thus, CSOs are prevented from sharing information and lessons learned in improving their influencing, and struggle to hold the IMF accountable to any commitments.
  • The quality of engagement varies widely (likely depending on the commitment of individual mission chiefs), ranging from a mere formality to genuine interest. However, perceived or real gaps in technical capacity between Fund staff and CSOs can make dialogue challenging – IMF staff approach meetings from extremely technical aspects of the economic policies under consideration. Given the power imbalances in the relationship, it falls on CSOs to adopt and speak the Fund’s language where they can, or risk not being taken seriously.
  • National governments, who are the Fund’s primary constituency, can directly or indirectly impede the IMF’s engagement with CSOs. This could be through actively attempting to limit civic space by censoring media campaigns, violently repressing protest movements, and in some cases punishing activists and their family members in retaliation for engaging with the IMF and/or criticising the government. The near-universal unpopularity of the IMF’s programmes means that the risk of public discontent drawing a repressive response of some sort is heightened.
  • Successful influencing of conditionalities is contingent on having a well-coordinated group of CSOs, combined with an open finance ministry and a mission chief who welcomed tripartite discussion (involving the IMF, the government and CSOs) before and after the IMF programme was approved.